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MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN INDIANA
HARRY T. ICE*
Any discussion of "Home Rule" should begin with a
definition of the phrase. The balance of this Article could
be consumed with that subject.' In order to limit the scope
of the term without entering into the controversial aspects
of it, let it be assumed-First, that it is used to refer to local
autonomy as distinguished from centralized state control;
and, Second, that reference is made only to civil cities and
towns, and not to counties, townships, school cities, school
towns, school townships, park, utility or sanitary districts,2
or any other political subdivisions of the State.
* Of the Indianapolis Bar.
"'While the rights of local self-government, or rights of home rule
are constantly dealt with by the courts, they have never been
precisely defined authoritatively. . . . Municipal home rule in its
broadest sense means the power of local self-government. . . . It
may be said that the idea of home rule in its comprehensive sense
includes (1) the choice of the character of the municipal organ-
ization, that is, the selection of the charter, (2) the nature and
scope of the municipal service, and (3) all local activity, whether
in carrying out or enforcing state law or municipal regulations,
in the hands of city or town officers, selected by the community."
1 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (1940) §93. Cf. State ez rel.
Clark v. Hawroth, Trustee, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N.E. 946, 947 (1889),
where it was said: "The right of local self-government is an in-
herent, and not a derivative one. Individualized, it is the right
which a man possesses in virtue of his character as a freeman.
It is not bestowed by legislatures, nor derived from statutes."
2 Counties, townships, school cities, school towns and school townships
are "corporations" and within the debt limitation provisions of
the Constitution, also "municipal corporations." Cf. Follett v.
Sheldon, 195 Ind. 610, 144 N.E. 867 (1924); Caldwell v. Bauer,
179 Ind. 146, 99 N.E. 117 (1912). Park, sanitary and utility)
districts are not, however, "municipal corporations" but are dis-
tricts existing solely at the will of the legislature. Cf. Board of
Commissioners v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N.E. 124 (1897); John-
son v. Board of Park Commissioners, 202 Ind. 282, 174 N.E. 91
(1930).
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The subject might be examined historically. It could
be explored philosophically, or pursued on the basis of resort
to the fundamental law and the judicial precedents.
The historical approach might begin with a study of
the Roman City and State-the English borough and the
crown, and proceed to the early colonial history of this coun-
try. The Ordinance of 1787 of the Congress of the United
States providing for the government of the Northwest Ter-
ritory and the Constitution of Indiana of 1816 studied in
the background of the time would throw some light on the
subject.
James Bryce in his American Commonwealth deals brief-
ly with the historical aspects of the subject, pointing out
that in New England, the town was the first strong unit of
local government, while in the southern States, by virtue
of the difference in the economic conditions, the county was
the important local body politic. In the midwest there was
a co-mingling of the condept of town government of New
England and county government of the south.3 The Ordi-
nance of 1787 is silent on the subject of municipal corpora-
tions. Such local government as existed was taken for grant-
ed. One writer has indicated that self-government was not
a real political issue of the time; that the real political issue
prior to statehood in Indiana was division of government into
counties. 4 Establishment of cities and towns by special char-
ter, a system which existed up until the turn of this century
in Indiana, began with laws adopted by the Governor and
Judges of the Indiana territory upon the granting of a char-
ter to the "Borough of Vincennes" on August 24, 1805. 5 Prior
to statehood, many towns had similar charters.
The Constitution of 1816 (the first document of funda-
mental law in Indiana), is marked by its silence on the sub-
ject of local government. However, there are inferences that
may be drawn from certain of its provisions. In Article I,
Section 2, it is provided that-
"All power is inherent in the people, and all free government is founded
on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness."
This later formed the keystone of the arch for the doctrine
% BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (rev. ed. 1914) c. XLVIII, p. 96.
4 Laws of Indiana Territory (1801-1809) p. lxiv.
5 Laws of Indiana Territory (1805) c. XVII.
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in the Supreme Court of Indiana that the fundamental law
of the State recognized the right of local self-government.
The balance of the Constitution of 1816 adds little. Article
11, Section 6, provides that all "district, county, or town
officers," shall reside within their respective units, and
Section 15 of the same Article provides "All town and town-
ship officers shall be appointed in such manner as shall be
directed by law." At least it may be said that these provisions
recognize the existence of local units of government.
Skipping for the moment the intervening period of de-
velopment of judicial opinion, and turning to the Constitu-
tion of 1851, we again find little. Article I, Section 1 contains
a provision similar to the one just quoted that "all power is
inherent in the people." In the balance of the Constitu-
tion, towns are referred to but five times, cities but once, and
municipal corporations twice. One of these provisions en-
tered the" Constitution in 1881 by amendment which restricted
the amount of debt. The references are entirely to incidental
matters, such as a prohibition against special laws for vacat-
ing streets, alleys and public squares in towns; providing
that officers of a town shall reside within the town; that
vacancies in offices shall be filled in the manner provided
by law; that impeachment of officers shall be in the manner
provided by law; and that one of the exemptions from taxa-
tion may be one of property held for "municipal purposes."6 On
the other hand, in both the Constitution of 1816 and 1851,
there are elaborate provisions with reference to township and
county government. Someone may make a real contribution
to this subject by the development, step by step, of the early
local communities, placing our two Constitutions in that back-
ground, and either establishing the proposition that local
self-government was assumed as an "inalienable" right, or
that the state was the principal unit considered by those
responsible for the drafting of our Constitutions. In any
such comparison, Schedule 4 of the Constitution of 1851 must
be considered, for there it was provided:
"All acts of incorporation for municipal purposes shall continue in
force under this Constitution until such time as the General Assembly
shall in its discretion, modify or repeal the same."
6Cf. IND. CONST. (1851) ART. IV, §23; ART. vi, §§5, 8 and 9; ART. X,
§§1 and 6.
19421
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Under this Section, it has been held by the Supreme Court
that the right of the General Assembly to exercise complete
authority over the corporate charter was expressly recog-
nized.7 But such a research would have only an academic
value, as we shall shortly see.
The Supreme Court first gave consideration to the ex-
tent of the right of local self-government in 1847, and in the
period from the first decision to the last important decision
rendered in 1935, the Supreme Court has travelled the coin-
plete circle of first a declaration of complete central authority
to an extensive denial of that authority, and finally a return
to the idea of full state authority. Several of the more im-
portant cases should be analyzed in order to present this cycle.
In 1847, the Supreme Court had before it an indictment
of an individual under a state statute adopted in 1845 con-
trolling the sale of spirituous liquors. In defense, it was
contended that the charter of the City of Richmond granted
in 1840 (in which the sale took place) gave "exclusive" con-
trol over such matters to the city. The Court affirmed the
conviction of "guilty," declaring that the State statute had
modified the Charter and saying that:
"Public or municipal corporations are established for the local govern-
ment of towns or particular districts. The special powers conferred
upon them are not vested rights as against the State, but being wholly
political exist only during the will of the general Legislature, other-
wise there would be numberless petty governments existing within the
State and forming a part of it, but independent of the control of the
sovereign power. Such powers may at any time be repealed or abro-
gated by the Legislature, either by a general law operating upon the
whole State, or by a special act altering the powers of the corporation."
Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361, 364 (1847).
For forty-two years, the doctrine of the Sloan case was un-
questioned. Three years later, the Court in upholding the
right of the State to exempt state bank property from taxa-
tion within a City, even though a prior City Charter author-
ized a tax, said:
"That City, like all other municipal corporations in our State, is
entirely under the control of the Legislature. Its charter may be
modified or repealed by the Legislature at any time." State Bank of
Indiana v. City of Madison, 3 Ind. 43, 46 (1851).
SWiley v. City of Bluffton, 111 Ind. 152, 12 N.E. 165 (1887) and
cases cited.
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The Legislature precipitated a controversy that caused
the Supreme Court to modify its earlier declarations as to
Home Rule. By Acts passed in 1889 and 1901, the Legisla-
ture provided for a Board of Public Works of the City of
Indianapolis to have complete jurisdiction of streets, sewers
and public buildings, the Board to be elected every two years
by the Legislature;s the establishment of a metropolitan
police and fire board for the City of Evansville, the Board
to be elected every two years by the Legislature and to have
complete control of the fire and police departments of the
City;" a like Board for the City of Indianapolis to control
police and fire departments, membership of the Board to be
elected by the Legislature;1O the creation of a Board of
Public Safety for the City of Fort Wayne vested with the
control of the police and fire departments of the City, the
members of the Board to be appointed by the Governor of
the State.1 The Mayors in each of these cities refused to
recognize the credentials of the newly chosen Board mem-
bers, and mandate actions were brought by such members
to obtain their office. In all four cases, the Supreme Court
refused the writ of mandate.12 Many legal propositions were
discussed, but the opinions were grounded upon a denial by
the terms of the Acts of the "inherent right of local self-
governmentY' 3 The one hundred thirteen pages of discussion
in these four opinions is the most extensive judicial consid-
eration of the doctrine of Home Rule by Indiana Courts. The
first of the decisions involved the Board of Public Works
established for the City of Indianapolis. Judge Coffey wrote
the opinion of the Court. A separate concurring opinion was
written by Judge Elliott, and a dissenting opinion by Judge
Mitchell. Judge Coffey's opinion proceeded, and I quote:
BActs of Indiana (1889) c. CXIX, p. 247.
0 Acts of Indiana (1889) c. CXII, p. 222.
10 Ibid.
"Acts of Indiana (1901) c. XCII, p. 132.
12 State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252 (1889);
City of Evansville v. State ex rel. Blend, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N.E.
267 (1889); State ex rel. Holt v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E.
274 (1889); State ex rel. Geake v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19(1901).
" See McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Gov-
ernment (1916) 16 COL. L. REV. 190, 299, and Peppin, Municipal
Home Rule in California (1941) 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 28.
19421
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"It is, perhaps, true that the General Assembly may, at will, pass
laws regulating the government of towns and cities, taking from them
powers which had previously been granted, or adding to that which
had previously been given, but we do not think that it can take away
from the people of a town or city rights which they possessed as citi-
zens of the State before their incorporation. The object of granting
to the people of a city municipal powers is to give them additional
rights and powers to better enable them to govern themselves, and
not to take away any rights they possessed before such grant was
made. It may be true, that as to such matters as the State has a
peculiar interest in, different from that relating to other communities,
it may, by proper legislative action, take control of such interests; but
as to such matters as are purely local, and concern only the people of
that community, they have the right to control them, subject only to
the general laws of the State, which affect all the people of the State
alike. The construction of sewers in a city, the supply of gas, water,
fire protection, and many other matters that might be mentioned, are
matters in which the local community alone is concerned, and in which
the State has no special interest, more than it has in the health and
prosperity of the people generally, and they are matters over which
the people affected thereby have the exclusive control, and it can not,
in our opinion, be taken away from them by the Legislature.
Municipal corporations are to be regarded in a two-fold character;
the one public, as regards the State at large, in so far as they are
its agents for government; the other private, in so far as they are
to provide for the local necessities and conveniences for their own
citizens; and as to the acquisitions they make in the latter capacity,
as mere corporations, it is neither just nor is it within the power of
the Legislature to take them away or to deprive the local community
of the benefit of them." (395-396)
Judge Coffey then traced the history of local self-govern-
ment in England and in America, and concluded:
"It is, therefore, perfectly apparent from the Constitution itself that
it was framed with reference to the then existing local governments
of counties, towns, townships and cities." (398)
This last statement had reference to Schedule 4 which pro-
vided:
"All acts of incorporation for municipal purposes shall continue in
force under this Constitution until such time as the General Assembly
shall in its discretion modify or repeal the same."
The Judge seems to have overlooked the force of the last
clause of the Schedule.
Elliott, J. concurring said that the question was simply
one of whether the General Assembly had the power to ap-
point local county, township, town and city officials. He
grounded his argument upon the rights "inherent in the
[Vol. 17
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people," which he said had its own innate vitality and vigor,
and which was older than the Constitution and even the Bill
of Rights. He said:
"It needed no constitutional declaration to invest the people with power,
but it does require a constitutional provision to take it from them in
whole or in part. This inherent power includes the right of the people
to choose their rulers. An essential part of this inherent power, as it
has been asserted and exercised for many years, is the right of the
electors of a locality to choose their own immediate officers. In my
judgment our Constitution does not take away this right, but leaves
it in the people, undiminished and undisturbed. There it has resided
for ages, and there it is to reside until the people shall, in due course,
change their organic law." (401)
Following this statement, he traces development of the right
of local self-government in England and in New England,
and says:
"By naming cities municipal corporations the right of local self-gov-
ernment was indicated as existing in their inhabitants. We get our
term 'municipal corporations,' from the words 'municeps,' or 'muni-
cipitis,' meaning, I may say, without professing to be strictly accurate,
'the right of a freeman'-the right to vote.
In a recent work the meaning of the word 'municipal' is thus illus-
trated: 'Pertaining to local self-government.' 5 Encylopaedic Dict.
131. Our Constitution recognizes and preserves this right, and the
thought of destroying it never entered the minds of the men who
framed that instrument." (401-402)
The Judge then traces the philosophical background, and
says, concluding on this point:
"The right of local self-government is, indeed, one of the strongest
and most efficient checks in our system of checks and balances . . .
(402)
Turning to the development of English law and the rebellion
at times against the power of Parliament, he examines the
representative character of the General Assembly and says:
"The municipal corporation as a local government is not represented
by the General Assembly, and to permit that body to designate the
officers who shall govern local affairs would be to tax the citizens of
the corporation without representation. This, it is hardly necessary
to say, would violate a principle which lies at the foundation of free
government. It is no answer to say, as is sometimes said, that the
municipal corporation has representatives in the General Assembly, for,
as a municipal corporation, it is not, as to its local affairs, represented
by that body, for that body represents the State and legislates in State
affairs. Incidentally it legislates, in a general way, for localities, but
19421
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only because the welfare of the whole State is thereby promoted. As a
part of the constituency of the Legislature the citizens of a town or
city are represented, but they are represented in the capacity of
citizens of the State and not as the inhabitants of a municipal cor-
poration. A town or city has but little power in any General Assembly,
and to permit that body to control their local affairs would put them
in charge of men from distant parts of the State who could have
little, if any, knowledge of local affairs and no direct interest in them,
so that the inhabitants of such a town or city would be governed by
persons who did not and who could not, in the just sense of the term,
represent them, and this result our Constitution will not tolerate.
I do not deny that the Legislature has the power to change the form
and mode in which municipal corporations shall be governed; on the
contrary, I affirm that without the consent of the inhabitants the
form of the corporate government may at any time be altered, but
I do deny that the Legislature has the power to deprive the electors
of a municipal corporation of the right to choose their own imme-
diate local officers. By immediate local officers, I mean such as are
charged with the control of purely local concerns, as the streets, the
fire apparatus, and the like matters. In the class of local officers I
do not include the peace-keeping officers, or the constabulary, for
such officers are, in reality, officers of the State, as it is the duty
of the State to provide for the personal safety of its citizens on the
thronged streets of a great city as well as on the secluded rural high-
ways. What I affirm, in short, is this: That because an elector lives
in a city he can not have the right to vote upon purely local affairs
taken from him by any statute." (409-410)
Mitchell, J., in dissenting opinion said:
"The Constitution has erected no standard by which to determine
what constitutes local self-government, or what are natural and in-
herent rights, as those terms relate to municipal government. These
are questions of political, and, therefore, of exclusively legislative
concern, with which other departments can not interfere without in-
vading the legislative domain.
Disputes over theories of local self-government began with the organ-
ization of civil society, and they will doubtless continue until human
government ends. Publicists and doctrinaires, whose writings are ap-
pealed to, are not agreed concerning the natural and inherent rights
of men, as related to government, nor is it best they should agree. Our
State Constitution was adopted by the people, as a well matured
scheme of practical, progressive government, and its written limitations
may be readily comprehended by intelligent men who are called to
engage in framing legislation adapted to the growing needs of every
portion of the State. Progress is at an end, however, if legislation
must wait until the courts set bounds to the shoreless sea of local
self-government, or until the judiciary ascertains and declares what
are the 'inseparable incidents' to written Constitutions under our re-
publican system.
The debate on those subjects must be left free, open and unfettered,
[Vol. 17
1942] MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN INDIANA
and it must be left, as all the authorities say, exclusively with the
people and their chosen representatives." (412-313)
He also said:
"Municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created by
the Legislature as governmental agencies of the State, and they can
only exercise such power as they derive from the source of their
creation. Such powers as they exercise are at all times subject to
legislative control, and in the absence of constitutional prohibition their
powers may be enlarged or diminished, or withdrawn altogether, and
their property devoted to other uses, as the Legislature may deter-
mine." (416-417)
"The error which lies at the root of the argument by which the
unconstitutionality of the acts here in question is attempted to be
maintained, springs out of the fallacious assumption that the people
of a city or town have any interest or inherent right whatever to
municipal government, while every atom and vestige of right in those
respects, under our system, are such, and only such, as the Legislature
confers. Upon this baseless assumption, which obliterates and con-
founds all distinctions between municipal regulation, a creature of
legislation, and county and township government which existed before
Legislatures were, and which is, and always was, common to every
community in the State, the whole fabric of argument adverse to the
constitutionality of these acts is builded." (418-419)
State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252 (1889).
The same division of members of the Court was marked in
each of the three other cases, but with different Judges writ-
ing the majority opinion in each case. The last case involv-
ing the Board of Public Safety of the City of Fort Wayne
was decided in 1901, and after the decision of that case, the
doctrine of local self-government was never again expressed
in terms so broad.
In fact, in 1912, just ten years later, when one member
of the Court disqualified himself for interest, the remaining
four members equally divided on the application of the doc-
trine of local self-government in a case in which by state
statute a sewer constructed by a contractor at a time when
the City was over its two per cent debt limit, was authorized
to be transferred to the contractor and leased to the City for
a sum sufficient to pay the contract price.14 Two members
of the Court felt that the sewer was property of the City
upon its construction, and that the Legislature could not take
such property from the City by legislative fiat. So they
stated, the doctrine of local self-government prohibited such
14.Jordan v. City of Logansport, 178 Ind. 629, 99 N.E. 1060 (1912).
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a taking. The two dissenting Judges, however, stated that
the argument that the statute deprived the City of the right
of local self-government was not tenable.
Only a short six years later, and in 1918, the Supreme
Court had before it the question of whether the Shively-
Spencer Act of 1913 vesting the control of utility companies
in the Public Service Commission abrogated certain provi-
sions of a franchise granted to the Logansport Telephone
Company by the City of Logansport. It was argued by the
Telephone Company in support of its position that the mat-
ter of utility service was a local affair, and in the inter-
ests of local self-government, the City charter should prevail
over the State regulation.15 Judge Harvey disposed of the
earlier cases in this case of Winfield v. Public Service Com-
'mission by saying:
"There are decisions of this court strongly supporting the right of
cities in matters of local self-government. (Citing the cases of 1889
and 1901.) Such decisions do not apply, however, when the interest
of the public generally is involved, as it is in general telephone service."
187 Ind. 53, 59, 118 N.E. 531, 533 (1918).
Eight short years later, in a case involving the applica-
tion of an Act of the Legislature touching the organization
and hours of operation of the Fire Department of the City
of New Albany, the Court said of the contention that the
Act denied the right of local self-government to the City of
New Albany:
"On the question of local self-government, we are advised of excep-
tional cases where legislation has been stricken down upon what is
sometimes called the 'reserved power of the people.' Such cases are
15 Authority still resides in the Public Service Commission to grant
indeterminate permits to public utilities. However, local control
has been generally recognized by the Legislature andthe Courts
as the rule in the case of municipally owned utilities. The con-
trolling statutes generally vest the authority to purchase, con-
struct, extend and improve utilities in the municipalities free from
the control of the Public Service Commission. See IND. STAT. ANN.(Burns, 1933) §54-105 et seq. But in certain special cases, the
Commission does have limited jurisdiction to approve the issuance
of bonds for acquisition, extension or improvement of utilities. Id.
at § 48-5345 et seq. (acquisition of waterworks); id. at § 48-5328,(improvement of unencumbered waterworks); id. at §48-5441 (im-
provement of waterworks in cities of fifth class). All utilities
acquired by municipalities under Chapter 190 of the Acts of 1933
are free from control of the Public Service Commission as to
rates, and any other municipally owned utility may be made free
from the control of the Public Service Commission as to rates
on the holding of an election for that purpose. Id. at §54-613.
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not made to rest upon any express written prohibition in the Con-
stitution, but upon restraints of legislative power to be drawn from
the inhibitory words and the language employed, considered and c6n-
strued as of the time and under the circumstances surrounding the
framers of the organic law. That reasoning was adopted by this
court in State ex rel. v. Denny, Mayor, 118 Ind. 382 (1889), and
State ex re. v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126 (1902). We have read the Denny and
Fox cases carefully, and under the particular facts then before the
court, the reasoning announced seems to be sound, but we are not
inclined to extend but to treat the doctrine followed in those cases as
an exception to the almost universal rule that legislative power is lim-
ited only by the express inhibitions of the Constitution."
(Judge Myers in State ex ret. Schroeder v. Morris, 199 Ind. 78, 88, 155
N.E. 198, 202 (1926).
The complete return to the doctrine of the Sloan case decided
in 1847 appears to have been accomplished in the case of
Zoercher v. Agler 16 decided in 1930, involving the power of-
the State Board of Tax Commissioners on petition to re-
view and reduce local tax levies. Judge Martin simply held
that it was
"unnecessary . . . to enter upon a discussion of the existence of 'the
right of local self-government' in cities, or to determine just what
such phrase includes. It can not include the right of taxation . . ."
The significance of this statement was pointed out five years
later in a dissenting opinion by Judge Fansler, where there
was again involved the same question, namely, the right of
the State Board of Tax Commissioners to control municipal
expenditures by the reduction of tax levies. 17 The ghost of
John Marshall rises in the opening statement of the dissent-
ing Judge:
"The power to control the amount of such expenditures, to limit them,
and to deny the city the right to derive such revenue as it may think
necessary to preserve its properties, and efficiently provide for the
public welfare and safety, is surely the power to destroy the efficiency
of city government and to jeopardize the efficiency, if not the existence,
of its established institutions. Not one authority is found that sus-
tains the contention that such power may be delegated to a state ad-
ministrative or ministerial board. The fundamental principles laid
down by every writer on the subject appear to be an insuperable argu-
ment against it." (653)
However, the majority of the Court made quick disposal of
the Home Rule argument:
16 202 Ind. 214, 226, 227, 172 N.E. 186 (1930).
1 7 See Dunn v. City of Indianapolis, 208 Ind. 630, 653, 196 N.E. 528
(1935).
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"Municipal corporations are creatures of the state. They possess such
powers only as are granted by the legislature in express words and
those necessarily implied and incidental to those expressly granted,
and those indispensable to the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation, and to its continued existence." (640)
"The government of the city of Indianapolis, a creature of the legis-
lature, is part of the taxation machinery, acting in an administrative
capacity, . . . " (640-641)
In 1931, the Supreme Court was presented with the
argument that the right of local self-government was in-
vaded by a statute giving the Public Service Commission
jurisdiction over the rates of a municipally owned electric
utility, and the Court devised a new formula to meet the ar-
gument. The Court said:
"While the doctrine of the right of local self-government as laid down
in the cases above cited (or at least a part of it), has been recognized
in later cases (see - citing cases), it would seem that the inherent
of common-law powers referred to are identical with those powers
which are commonly designated as 'implied' or 'incidental' powers of
a municipal corporation essential to enable it to accomplish the end
for which it is created. (Citing cases) This court has declared repeat-
edly that municipal corporations are subordinate branches of the do-
mestic government of the state and possess only those powers expressly
granted to them by the Legislature, those necessarily or fairly im-
plied in or incident to powers expressly granted, and those indispensable
to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.
The power of a municipality to own a public utility is generally con-
sidered to be neither an inherent nor an indispensable implied power,
• (529-531)18
This hasty review of the principal decisions indicating
that the Court has traveled in a circle and is now back to
its opinion of 1847, is perhaps unfair to the Court, for even
at full bloom of the doctrine of local self-government, there
were certain limitations recognized even by its exponents.
It may not be wholly accurate to say that today the doctrine
does not prevail to some extent in Indiana. If the Legisla-
ture were to again pass laws as bluntly projecting the State
into local affairs as in 1889, with no justification to be found
either in the necessities of the social or economic conditions,
the Court might again, if no other Constitutional thrust
would invalidate such acts, resort to the right of "local self-
18 City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission, 202 Ind. 523, 529-
530, 177 N.E. 249, 251 (1931); cf. Underwood v. Fairbanks Morse
& Co., 205 Ind. 316, 325, 185 N.E. 118, 121 (1933), holding that
a city or town has "inherent" authority to provide light and water
for "public purposes."
[Vol. 17/
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government" as the lance to administer the coup-de-grace.
It is not an over-statement that the right of Home Rule
exists now only by suffrance of the 150 men who meet every
other year as the General Assembly of Indiana. 9 For in the
period since 1901, that body by the process of gradual cen-
tralization has granted to state administrative agencies or
quasi judicial bodies much that was once considered a matter
of purely local concern. A foremost example of this encroach-
ment is the State Board of Tax Commissioners with its con-
trol over tax levies, budgets and appropriations.20 Every
budget item, from the purchase of meat for the dog pound
to the construction of a boulevard in the City passes under
its scrutiny, and every additional 'appropriation not included
in the budget must first have its approval. The State Board
of Accounts exercises a complete check on expenditure.21 The
Public Service Commission, except in cases where elections
are held to remove utilities from their jurisdiction, exercise
complete control over the rates, extensions and additions to,
and even acquisition of, municipal utilities.22 The State Board
of Health, with its inspections and controls, reduced local
Boards to the status of office boys. -3  The State Board of
Stream Polution even has authority to order a municipal cor-
poration to build sewers and disposal works and to issue
bonds therefor.24 Lo, how far we have wandered from Judge
Coffey's opinion in 1889 where he said:
"The construction of sewers in a city . . . is a matter of purely local
concern . . . over which the people affected have the exclusive con-
trol . . . ,,25
19 A difference might be suggested between "constitutional Home Rule"
and "statutory Home Rule." The difference lies only in the
source from which the right stems. In the former, it springs
from the fundamental law of the Constitution, and in the latter
from the acts of the Legislature. Both are within the protection of
the Courts, buti the latter must of necessity yield to the will of
each successive Legislature.
2OCf. Acts of Indiana (1919) c. 59, §§200-201, as amended by Acts of
Indiana (1935) c. 150.
21 Acts of Indiana (1909) c. 55, as amended.
22 Control of rates of municipal utilities. Acts of Indiana (1933) c.
190, §19. Approval of bonds for acquisition of or extensions to
municipal utilities. Cf. Acts of Indiana (1921) c. 96, as amended;
Acts of Indiana (1929) c. 155, as amended; Acts of Indiana (1933)
c. 235; Acts of Indiana (1933) c. 259.
23 Acts of Indiana (1891) c. 15, as amended.
24Acts of Indiana (1935) c. 152, §§6, 8, 9.
25 State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 395, 21 N.E. 252, 257
(1889).
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All these controls and many more mark the trend towards
centralized government.26
The legislature never prior to 1921 gave cities any choice
as to their form of government, although all but three other
States permitted a choice of the form of local government.27
The proponents of the City Manager form of Govern-
ment in 1921 succeeded in procuring the passage of an Act
authorizing the adoption of the City Manager plan. The
Act successfully weathered its first attack in the Courts. On
every score of constitutionality raised, its validity was upheld.
Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble, 201 Ind. 88, 166, N.E. 270
(1929). Five months later, and on September 24, 1929, in the
26 The courts have erected no effective barriers. The reason lies in
the doctrine that a municipal corporation is the creature of the
State. Hence as a corollary, it can not challenge the validity
of a state statute. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S.
182 (1923). In line with this doctrine, legislative control is firmly
established over the following features of municipal existence and
activity:
(a) Corporate existence-
Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361 (1847).
State Bank of Indiana v. City of Madison, 3 Ind. 43 (1851).
Lucas v. Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Co., 44 Ind.
524 (1873).
Eichels v. Evansville Street Railway Co., 78 Ind. 261 (1881).
Warren v. City of Evansville, 106 Ind. 104, 5 N.E. 876 (1885).
Lutz v. City of Crawfordsville, 109 Ind. 466, 10 N.E. 411
(1886).
State ex rel. City of Terre Haute v. Kolsom, 130 Ind. 434,
29 N.E. 595 (1891).
State ex rel. Schroeder v. Morris, 199 Ind. 78, 155 N.E. 198
(1926).
Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930).
City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission, 202 Ind.
523, 177 N.E. 249 (1931).(b) Contracts-
Downey v. Indiana State Board of Agriculture, 129 Ind. 443,
28 N.E. 123 (1891).
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 14 Wheat. 518
(17 U.S. 518, 1819).
Schneck v. City of Jeffersonville, 152 Ind. 204, 52 N.E. 212
(1898).
(c) Municipal Funds-
Storen v. Sexton, 209 Ind. 589, 200 N.E. 251 (1936).
Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Home for Friendless Women,
50 Ind. 215 (1875).(d) Municipal property-
Lucas v. Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe Co., 44 Ind.
524 (1873).
Jordan v. City of Logansport, 178 Ind. 629, 99 N.E. 1060
(1912).
(e) Municipal Tax Levies-
Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930).
City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission, 202 Ind.
523, 177 N.E. 249 (1931).
27See Report, Indiana City Manager Commission, October 1, 1940, p. 5.
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case of Keane v. Remy, 201 Ind. 286, the same Court destroyed
the hopes of the friends of the plan for ultimate success
through the legislative process. In the Keane case on a very
technical construction, the Court held the same Act, which
it had declared to be constitutional in the first instance, to
be invalid.
Since that time, the agitation for the right of cities to
adopt their own form of government has continued.28 In 1939 a
concurrent resolution was adopted by the General Assembly
authorizing the appointment of a Commission to "study, draft
and submit" to the legislature
"such legislation as is necessary to provide the authority for the adop-
tion of the Manager plan of Government in Cities throughout the
State."
In the preamble of the resolution, it was declared:
"1In the interest of local self-government and Home Rule, it should lie
within the province of the majority of the citizens of each City to
select for themselves the form of the government of such City." Act
of Indiana (1939) c. 176.
An able Commission was appointed under the Act with seven
members, two named by the President of Purdue University,
two named by the President of Indiana University, and one
each by the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor and the
Speaker of the House. The Commission consisted of Clar-
ence W. Efroymson, Indianapolis, Chairman, Pressley S.
Sikes, Bloomington, Secretary, John W. Esterline, Eli Lilly
and Virgil K. Shepherd, of Indianapolis, Roy J. Harrison of
Attica, Alfred H. Randall of Fort Wayne, members.
On October 1, 1940, this Commission reported for adop-
tion an amendment to the Constitution of the State,29 which
28 Cf., "There are impressive indications that American Cities are mov-
ing into a fifth period of legal development, a period in which
the emphasis is upon function and administration rather than
geographical areas and the legal distribution of governmental
powers." Fordham, The West Virginia Municipal Home Rule Pro-
posal (1932) 38 w. vA. L. Q. 235, 238. See also Reinhart, Municipal
Home Rule in Colorado (1930) 28 MICH. L. REV. 382, 403, and
Weiner, Municipal Home Rule in New York (1937) 37 CoL. L. REV.
557, 561 (asserting that the demand for home rule is waning in
certain states).
29 Seventeen states have Home Rule provisions in their Constitutions.
In the following ten of the seventeen, any form of charter may
be adopted by the voters without any further action by the Legis-
lature:
ARIZ. CONST. (1910) ART. XIII; COLO. CONST. ART. XX; MD. CONST. ART.
xI-a; MICH. CONST. ART. VIII; MO. CONST. ART. IX; NEB. CONST. ART.
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without further legislation would permit cities and towns to
establish Charters fixing (1) their form of government; (2)
the method of election of their officials ;30 (3) the distribution
of functions; (4) conditions of employment for employees;
(5) administration of special districts created.3 1 The amend-
ment as written was introduced in the General Assembly of
1941, and after a process of amendment, a much shorter
form was passed.3 2 The principal difference between the
draft submitted by the Commission and the one adopted by
the Legislature is that in the legislative draft the self-exe-
cuting provisions were eliminated. Under this last draft, it
will be necessary for the Legislature to pass an enabling act
XI; N.Y. CONST. ART. x; OHIO CONST. ART. XVII; ORE. CONST. ART.
XI; UTAH CONST. ART. XI.
In the following states, further legislative action must be taken
or approval granted by the Governor before a charter may be
adopted: CALIF. CONST. ART. XI; MINN. CONST. ART. IV; OKLA. CONST.
ART. LVIII; TEX. CONST. ART. XI; WASH. CONST. ART. XI; W. VA.
CONST. ART. VI; WIS. CONST. ART. XI. For a discussion of home
rule history, amendments, and decisions in various states, see
Anderson, Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota (1923) 7 MINN. L.
REV. 306; David, Home- Rule in California (1940) 5 LEGAL NOTES
ON LOCAL GOV'T. 125; Dawley, Special Legislation and Municipal
Home Rule in Minnesota: Recent Developments (1932) 16 MINN.
L. REV. 659, 672; Fordham, The West Virginia Municipal Home
Rule Proposal (1932) 38 w. VA. L. Q. 235, 329; Jacobson, Charter
Amending Powers of Cities Under Michigan Home-Rule Legisla-
tion (1916) 14 MICH. L. REV. 281; Montague, Law of Municipal Home
Rule in Oregon (1920) 8 CALIF. L. REV. 151; Peppin, Municipal
Home Rule in California: I (1941-2) 30 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 272;
Reinhart, Municipal Home Rule in Colorado (1930) 28 MICH. L.
REV. 382; Weiner, Municipal Home Rule in New Yorkc (1937) 37
COL. L. REV. 557; Note (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 92.
30 provision is broad enough to end any constitutional doubt as
to proportional representation as a method for selection of city:
officials. The system was held valid in Reutner v. Cleveland, 107
Ohio St. 117, 141 N.E. 27 (1923); Hile v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St.
144, 141 N.E. 35 (1923); and Johnson v. New York, 274 N.Y.
411, 9 N.E. (2d) 30 (1937). It was held invalid in Wattle v.
Upjohn, 211 Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335 (1920); and People v. Elkus,
59 Cal. App. 396, 211 Pac. 34 (1922). It is also broad enough
to authorize preferential voting which has been held valid in Orpen
v. Watson, 86 N. J. L. 69, 93 Atl. 853, 96 Atl. 43 (1915); Zent v.
Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728 (1908); Adams v. Lansdon, 18
Idaho 483, 110 Pac. 280 (1910); Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio
St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913). The system has been held invalid
in Brown v. Smallwood, 130 Minn. 492, 153 N.W. 935 (1915). No
comment is made on the wisdom of the system of proportional
representation or preferential voting. Indiana has no decision upon
the subject, but Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987 (1916)
indicates the Court might follow Michigan, California and Minne-
sota. For a thorough analysis and condition of the systems, see
HERMANS, DEMOCRACY OR ANARCHY (1941).
31See Appendix B.
3 2 See Acts of Indiana (1941) c. 243, set forth in full in Appendix A.
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before Charters may be adopted, whereas such legislative ac-
tion was not necessary under the Commission's original draft.
The amendment must be concurred in by the next session
of the Legislature and approved at an election by the people
before it can become a part of the Constitution. The amend-
ment provides for the adoption of a law by the General As-
sembly for the choice of form of government by cities and
towns through adoption of Charters which may provide for
the selection of officials, and prohibits the Legislature from
passing local or special laws affecting the powers of Charter
cities or towns, and providing also that the Legislature shall
not enact any law which will "restrict, reduce, suspend or re-
peal" the provisions of any Charter theretofore adopted, so
far as the same relate to (a) the form of government; (b) the
selection of officials; (c) the compensation of officers or em-
ployees; or (d) the distribution of functions to Boards, Bu-
reaus and Commissions. Under this Section, if it becomes
a part of the Constitution, before City Charters may be adopt-
ed, the Legislature must first pass an enabling act.
The Commission in its deliberations was obviously moved
by two impelling influences- (First) in the recommendation
of an amendment to the Constitution rather than a statute,
the Commission acknowledged the doubtful status under ju-
dicial decisions of the right to local self-government and also
the need for permanency of a City Charter. Without some
provision in the fundamental law, any charter City would
hold its form of government by sufferance of each successive
General Assembly. Apparently the Commission felt that
a Charter City should not be burdened every two years with
the threat of a political challenge of repeal of its charter in
the Legislature every two years. And, secondly, the Com-
mission must have recognized that under present day condi-
tions, complete local autonomy could not be safely granted
to Cities and Towns. Undoubtedly these men must have
shared the fear expressed in 1847 by the Supreme Court in
the Sloan case, of the establishment of "numberless petty gov-
ernments within the state . . .independent of the control of
the sovereign power."3 3 So the Commission wisely recom-
mended local self-government in only the five enumerated
33 Sloan v. State, 8 Blackf. 361 (1847). "Municipal Home Rule is sug-
gestive of the federal idea within a state." Fordham, The West
Virginia Municipal Home Rule Proposal (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q.
235, 247.
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respects just mentioned, and provided that in all other in-
stances, the general laws applicable to municipal bodies should
apply to charter cities and towns.
The present proposed amendment, if adopted and ap-
proved by the electors, will usher in, in Indiana, a new era in
the government of cities and towns. The amendment is
broadly written so that any form of government, whether
it be City-Manager, Mayor-Council or Commission, or even
some new form not yet devised, may be adopted by the
Charter and given a permanency revocable only by the will
of the electors within the city or town.
The adoption of the amendment and an enabling act
under it will also present many new problems. Problems of
construction will, undoubtedly, reach the Supreme Court,
and whether that body construes the amendment liberally or
strictly will have much to do with the ultimate successful
operation under the amendment and enabling act. It is sub-
mitted that when the amendment becomes law, it is tanta-
mount to a declaration by the people that there are certain
fundamental concerns of government that are local in char-
ter, and the Court should have regard for this declaration.
It should, within the limits of the amendment, accord it a
liberal construction.
Perhaps the amendment marks an end to the long judicial
controversy over local self-government, establishing for a
time at least a compromise between centralization and Home
Rule, setting off as local the right to choice of form of gov-
ernment, selection of officials, distribution of functions, and
provision for compensation of officials, but leaving to the
State as matters of general concern all legislation relating to
the public health, safety an dmorals, and leaving also to the
State those controls now exercised in all fields over taxation
and other functions too numerous to narrate. Broadly the
dividing line seems to be that as to form of government and
all that it includes, the problem is local; but as to funiction
and all that i includes, the problem is state-wide and should
be dealt with by state authority.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter 243, Acts of 1941, page 967
A JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT
TO THE Constitution of the State of Indiana by creating
and adding a new article to be numbered Article 17 pro-
viding for city and town charters.(H. J. R. 5.)
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT - RE-
FERRED TO NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
Sec. 1. BE IT RESOLVED BY THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, That the fol-
lowing proposed amendment to the Constitution of the State
of Indiana is hereby proposed and agreed to by this, the
82d General Assembly of the State of Indiana, and is hereby
referred to the next General Assembly for reconsideration
and agreement.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT-ARTICLE 17.
Sec. 2. That the Constitution of the State of Indiana
be amended by adding thereto an Article 17, Section 1, to
read as follows:
Article 17. Sec. 1. The General Assembly shall pro-
vide by law for the adoption of alternative forms of civil
government by the voters of cities and towns through local
adoptions of charters, and for the amendment or repeal by
the voters of cities or towns from time to time of charters
so adopted. Any such charter may provide for any method
of nomination, election, or recall or elective officers, provided
the secrecy of the ballot and rights of suffrage are main-
tained. No local or special law shall be enacted which has
the effect of withholding powers from, or restricting the
powers of, any charter city or town. No amendment, revi-
sion or repeal of any law providing for the adoption, amend-
ment or repeal of charters of cities and towns shall restrict,
reduce, suspend or repedl the provisions of any charter there-
tofore adopted by the voters of any city or town insofar as
such provisions relate to its form of government, the nomi-
nation, election, term or recall of its officers, or compensation
of officers or employees, or distribution of functions or
duties to officers, employees, departments, boards, bureaus,
or commissions.
APPENDIX B
A Joint Resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the State of Indiana by creating and adding a
new Article to be numbered Article 17 providing for
City and Town Charters.
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Sec. 1. Be it resolved by the General Assembly of
the State of Indiana, That the following proposed amendment
to the Constitution of the State of Indiana is hereby pro-
posed and agreed to by this, the Eighty-Second General As-
sembly of the State of Indiana, and is hereby referred to
the next General Assembly for reconsideration and agree-
ment.
Sec. 2. That a new and additional Article be added to
the Constitution of the State of Indiana to read as follows:
"Article 17-City and Town Charters.
Sec. 1. Any incorporated city or town may frame
and adopt a charter for its own civil government, or reframe
an existing charter adopted pursuant to this Article, in the
following manner: The common council or other legislative
authority of the city or town, by a two-thirds vote of its
members, may and, upon written petition of qualified electors
within such city or town equal in number to at least ten per
cent of the total votes cast therein at the last preceding gen-
eral election for secretary of state in cities and for clerk-
treasurer in towns, shall provide by ordinance for the sub-
mission to the qualified electors of such city or town of the
question "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter
for the City (or Town) of .................... ?" Such
ordinance shall require the submission at the next general
election, if one shall occur not less than sixty nor more than
one hundred and twenty days after its passage; otherwise
at a special election to be called and held within the time
aforesaid and on a day named in such ordinance. The pro-
posed charter commission shall consist of eleven members,
each of whom shall be a qualified elector of such city or
town, and they shall be chosen by the qualified electors within
such city or town at the same time as the submission of the
question. Candidates therefor shall be nominated by writ-
ten petition signed by qualified electors within such city or
town equal in number to at least one-half of one percent of the
total votes cast therein at the last preceding general election
for secretary of state 4n cities and for clerk-treasurer in towns,
but the signatures of more than one thousand qualified elec-
tors shall not be required for the nomination of any candidate.
Such nominating petition or petitions shall be filed with the
clerk of the city or town at least thirty days prior to the
date set for the submission of the question. Candidates for
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the proposed charter commission may also be nominated in
the original petition for submission of the question.
The ballot shall contain the question and the names of
the candidates for members of the proposed charter commis-
sion, but without party designation. Each elector shall have
the privilege of voting for eleven candidates. If a majority
of the qualified electors voting on the question of choosing
a commission shall vote in the affirmative, then the eleven
candidates receiving the highest number of votes cast at
such election shall constitute the charter commission, and
shall proceed to frame a charter. If a charter has not been
framed within one year from the date of the election, the
commission shall be automatically discharged and a new com-
mission may be chosen in the manner hereinabove prescribed.
The commission shall act at all times by majority vote of
its members.
The charter so framed shall be submitted to the qualified
electors of the city or town at an election to be held at a time
determined by the charter commission. Alternative charter
provisions may also be framed by the commission and sub-
mitted to be voted on separately, but at the same election.
The proposed charter and alternative charter provisions,
bearing the written approval of a majoriy of the members
of the commission, shall be deposited with the clerk of the
city or town, who shall cause such charter and notice of such
election to be published once a week for four weeks in one
or more newspapers of general circulation in such city or
town. Such proposed charter and such alternative charter
provisions as are approved by a majority of the electors vot-
ing thereon, shall become the charter of such city or town
at such time as may be fixed therein, and shall supersede all
laws affecting the organization and civil government of such
city or town which may be in conflict therewith. Within ten
days after such approval a copy of such charter as adopted,
certified by the presiding officer of the common council
or other legislative authority and authenticated by the seal
of such city or town, shall be made in triplicate and deposited,
one in the office of the secretary of state, one in the office
of the recorder of the county in which the city or town is
located, and one in the official records of the city or town.
Amendments to any charter so adopted may be proposed
by the common council or other legislative authority of the
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city or town upon a two-thirds vote thereof, or by written
petition of qualified electors of the city or town equal in
number to ten per cent of the total votes cast within the
city or town at the last preceding general election for secre-
tary of state in cities and for clerk treasurer in towns. Any
such amendment shall be submitted at the next general elec-
tion, if one shall occur not less than sixty nor more than
one hundred and twenty days after its proposal in either of
the two methods herein prescribed; otherwise, at a special
election to be called and held within the time aforesaid. Prior
to such election the clerk of such city or town shall cause
the proposed amendment or amendments to be published as
in the case of original charters. If any such amendments
be approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon,
the same shall become part of the charter at the time fixed
in such amendment, and the clerk of the city or town shall
cause the same to be certified and filed as in the case of
original charters.
The general election laws of the state then in force shall
govern the elections herein provided for to the extent such
laws are applicable. If conflicting charter provisions are
approved by a majority of the electors at the same election
the provisions receiving the largest affirmative vote shall
prevail to the extent of the conflict.
Sec. 2. The common council or other legislative author-
ity of such city or town shall provide and appropriate an
amount necessary for the reasonable expenses of the com-
mission and for holding elections as provided in this article;
and may borrow funds for such purposes.
Sec. 3. Any city or town forming its charter under this
constitution shall have and is hereby granted the authority
to exercise the following powers relative to its local affairs:
1. To prescribe its own form of civil government. Where
a state law places a duty or responsibility upon cities or
towns, a charter city or town shall either by the terms of
its charter or in a manner prescribed by the charter deter-
mine which city or town official shall exercise that duty or
responsibility.
2. To adopt by terms of its charter methods for th
nomination and election and recall of its elective officers, pro-
vided the secrecy of the ballot is maintained.
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3. To create, abolish or combine departments, divisions,
bureaus, sections, commissions, boards, or agencies to carry
out the functions of local civil government.
4. To provide for the election, compensation, hours of
work and dismissal of all its officers and employees, and
terms of office of elected officials.
5. To administer any special districts already created
or hereafter created if more than half the area of such dis-
tricts lies within such city or town, except that this clause
shall not apply to districts heretofore created for the purpose
of operating public utilities unless the General Assembly
directs otherwise by law.
Sec. 4. All powers of local civil government except
those specified as numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of section 3 shall
be subject to general laws. But no law shall be enacted
which has the effect of withholding powers from, or restrict-
ing the powers of, a charter city or town unless all cities or
towns of the state are likewise limited or restricted.
Sec. 5. All laws relating to cities and towns not incon-
sistent with this constitution shall remain in force until they
shall expire or until they shall be repealed or until they are
superseded, in so far as they are within the specified powers
granted to chartered cities or towns, by provisions of the
charter or by legislative action of such cities or towns.
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